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Latin America faces today a crossroads, as the advances in the globalization impose the 
need to redefine its position in the world economy for the next decades.  After the reform 
process of the late 1980s and 1990s was implemented some Latin American countries showed 
important growth results in a range of dimensions: education indexes, income per capita, 
and exports competitiveness in specific world markets. Also there has been significant 
advancement in democratization and organization of the civil society. In institutional 
terms, the level of sophistication of the NSI increased considerably; there have been 
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important advances in terms of the variety of agents and the deployment of their 
functions. Many countries have improved their level of industrialization and today they 
are considered to be middle income economies. However the growth performance of most 
countries in the 1990s has been rather disappointing. Besides this unsatisfactory growth 
performance, equity aspects and social needs constitutes important worrying characteristic of 
contemporary trends in the region.  
 
The limited achievements of Latin American economies as compared to the success of 
several Asian economies have highlighted the urgent need that the region have to start 
building upon a new way of thinking its strengths, and built a new insertion in the world 
economy. But, what are the analytical tools that it can count upon? The NSI and RSI 
approaches have been broadly diffused, as well as the ‘fitting’ innovation policies to 
strengthen these systems. In both cases the analytical frameworks were though for other 
context, the central economies environment, and there have been difficulties in adapting 
them to the region’s conditions. Partially this explains the poor achievement obtained 
and makes clear the need that Latin America has to rethink all these ideas from its own 
perspective and conditions. 
 
Latin America has important endowments of natural resources and many countries have 
specialized on manufacturing sectors and got position in world markets. However, 
natural resources have been mostly seen as a source of funding manufacturing activities 
and industrialization; to the extreme, this has been seen as a discouragement to look for 
alternatives for development due to the success of raw materials export. In the last 
decades, after the crisis of the import industrialization model, there has been an 
increasing attention to the role of natural resources as an alternative for Latin America. 
In this direction, Katz (2000) argues that Latin-American countries have restructured in 
the direction of their underlying ‘natural’ (static) comparative advantages, making better 
use of their high quality natural resources (mines, forests, gas and petroleum, 
agriculture) as well as of the abundant, relatively cheap and unskilled labor. These 
changes in production specialization came hand-in-hand with concomitant changes in 
the trade specialization.  
 
Referring to changes in innovation systems, Arocena and Sutz (2005) argument that 
advances of knowledge in biological fields have provided a new basis for 
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transformations in the production of goods and services. This may apply to the 
emergence of innovation systems based on life sciences (bio-innovation systems), 
which are connected with agriculture and health services. However, until now there has 
not been an explicit strategy for development considering natural resources. In the last 
few years, has emerged a new perspective on their contribution to development (de 
Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and Maloney 2001 Bortagaray 2007, Perez 2008), the most 
articulated proposal of a strategy for Latin America has been presented by Perez (2008). 
 
Recently, Carlota Perez presented the document titled “A vision for Latin America: a 
resource-based strategy for technological dynamism and social inclusion”, elaborated 
for ECLA. This document reflects about Latin America’s opportunities during the 
current deployment stage of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
paradigm, and the installation stage of a new paradigm, which seems to be oriented 
towards biotechnology, nanotechnology, new materials and new energy sources. It 
suggests a dual development strategy for Latin American countries – “dual integrated 
model” – based on science, technology and innovation (STI) for building robust 
resource based-processing industries and specializing on high added value products. 
Such a model integrates a top-down strategy of development, which aims at achieving 
competitiveness on world markets for specialized natural resources-based products, 
with a bottom-up strategy, which seeks to generate employment and identify and 
promote wealth-creation activities amongst localities.  
 
As it has been broadly discussed, each paradigm implies not only technological change 
but also new ways of thinking or a new common sense towards efficiency and 
innovation, new ways of acting and new institutions (Dosi 1982, Perez 1985 and 2002). 
In this sense, in order to establish a strategy that benefits from the deployment of a 
paradigm or takes advantage of the installation stage, it requires the emergence of new 
social norms and new forms of agents’ behavior. In this proposal of a dual strategy, 
social norms related to STI and forms of behavior acquire a particular relevance. 
 
Social norms are built and change at a slow pace. They are inserted into the social 
systems that operate inside society, and even more, they influence the forms of behavior 
from academics, entrepreneurs and other agents, and even society’s perception 
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regarding the STI community.3 The behavior of agents obeys to social norms, and 
therefore, while facing paradigm shifts, and even other changes of minor depth, agents 
tend to reproduce old ways of doing things and observe difficulties in changing their 
behaviors. 
 
Social norms are influenced by existing incentives. In this way, policy should generate a 
range of incentives consistent with the paradigm, in order to foster new opportunities, 
and stimulate change in agents’ behavior. Difficulties to generate a new coherent 
incentives structure could restrict the shift towards new behaviors, and therefore, 
towards the diffusion of new technologies and the taking advantage of a new window of 
opportunity. This is why a reflection oriented to taking advantage of a window of 
opportunity should include the issue of the incentives structure required to induce 
change amongst agents’ behavior and promote new ways of thinking and acting. There 
is limited knowledge regarding the influence of public policy over the shift in 
established social norms and the behavior of the STI community.  
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion of the dual strategy based on 
natural resources for Latin America proposed by Carlota Perez (2008). It focuses on the 
required changes of the existing incentives to promote new behaviors among STI agents 
according to the mentioned strategy, and on other issues related to the viability of such 
strategy, such as leadership and the building of consensus and governance. This 
reflection draws on the Mexican case. 
 
The Mexican experience is interesting for different reasons: there are abundant natural 
resources and important technological capabilities in resource based processing 
industries, also it has been built capabilities in other manufacturing industries; there has 
also been a huge effort devoted to the formation of human resources, and recently, STI 
is flourishing in several regions of the country. Additionally, since 2001 a change has 
been introduced in the design of STI policy oriented to accelerating the building of 
technological capabilities and stimulating innovation. The experience of designing and 
implementing this STI policy and the problems that it has been confronted allow the 
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 5 
identification of some caveats associated with the design and implementation of a new 
strategy.  
 
The content of this document is as follows: after this introduction section 2 raises some 
doubts about the applicability of the current innovation policy framework to DC 
context; section 3 presents a brief description of Carlota Perez´s proposal of the dual 
strategy of development based on natural resources; section 4 synthesizes efforts that 
have taken place in Mexico during the last decade to design and implement a new STI 
strategy; section 5 reflects over such experience on topics related to the structure of 
incentives and the behavior of agents, the definition of leadership, the conditions to 
ensure the governance of the National System of Innovation (NSI) and the construction 
of consensus between agents. Section 6 contains final reflections. 
 
2. Current innovation policy framework and developing countries 
context 
 
From the systems-evolutionary perspective there were significant advances in the 
approaches to STI policies. International organizations have adopted many of its ideas 
and integrated them in an analytical framework for the so-called ‘innovation policy’, 
which has been diffused in developing countries. However, there is still a lack of 
understanding about how to apply this framework in developing countries settings, 
particularly Latin American and African countries. (Dutrénit et al 2007, Kaplan 2008)  
 
There are at least two features of these countries’ NSI that may affect whatever policy 
making and implementing processes is attempted: (i) there is neither the required 
amount of STI capabilities nor the diversity of agents, or in other words they have not 
acquired a critical mass of these capabilities, and (ii) the links between the agents are 
limited. Therefore, the initial conditions are different from those of the developed 
countries whose structural features and experiences have been taken into account for 
building such analytical framework. Several studies have documented the weaknesses 
of the NSI in these countries (Cimoli 2000, FCCT 2006, Lorentzen 2009, Cassiolato, 
Lastres and Maciel 2003, Lall and Pietrobelli 2002, Muchie, Gammeltoft and Lundvall 
2003, Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2006), and other have focused on the flaws of STI policy 
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design and implementation (FCCT 2006; Velho 2005; Chudnovsky, Niosi and 
Bercovich 2000; Vonortas 2002, Mani 2004, Kaplan 2008). 
 
In current decade there have been a wave of evaluations of the NSI and their innovation 
policy, which were based on international methodologies developed by OCDE, 
European Commission, BID, etc. The most consistent worldwide evaluations have been 
the reviews by OCDE of the NSI of several countries, such as China, Mexico, Chile, 
New Zealand, Hungary, Korea and others. A set of recommendations for the innovation 
policy has been issued to strengthening the NSI. Which is tricky is that the same type of 
recommendations are given to developing countries as well as to more advanced 
economies like Belgium, Spain, France, Finland or even UK. 
 
Mexico, like other countries, has followed recommendations by OCDE, BID and 
European Commission, as described in Section 3 and 4, but the results of implementing 
those recommendations are far from those expected. Why Mexico cannot reach better 
results? Is there a problem with the policy design? Is there a problem with the policy 
implementation? It is difficult to give a simple answer to this question, as the problem is 
complex one and depends on a set of factors. However, there are some issues that can 
make a contribution to explain these ‘failures’.  
 
First, these recommendations are based on an analytical framework that was designed 
according to countries that have more mature NSI or bases of experiences of successful 
countries, like Korea. Then, the focus is located more on the increase and mould of a 
critical mass of STI capabilities than on the creation of this critical mass to generate 
endogenous processes. In the same line, the policy in this arena is defined as innovation 
policy and not as STI policy. Even though innovation policy includes programs to 
strengthen science and technology, the message that is sent is that innovation goes first. 
If a country has the critical science and technology bases, then it is possible to focus on 
innovation, but if not, then it is still necessary to strengthen science and technology to 
generate the critical mass at the same time that innovation is fostered. In this sense, it 
would be more appropriate to call it STI policy so that the right message is given. 
Second, as discussed in section 4, the resources allocation shows a different set of 
implicit priorities that rule the policymaking process. This is related to programs that 
cannot be eliminated without a conflict with the scientific community, like the funding 
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for basic science, the productivity programs for researchers, and the postgraduate 
scholarships. This brings about an old discussion about implicit/explicit STI policies in 
Latin American (Velho 2005). Third, as it is discussed in section 5, implementation was 
affected by: a low public investment on STI, slow changes of the institutional set-up for 
the public research system, and governance and coordination between multiple new 
agents.  
  
Concerning to the first issue, it is related in some way with general features of the 
developing world, which are present in Mexico and not considered in the analytical 
framework of innovation policy: inequity (unequal income distribution, high poverty 
level and low level of satisfaction of basic needs); immaturity of the democratic 
processes and of the civil society; only recent macro stability after long periods of 
disequilibrium and instability; immaturity of the institutions and the whole institutional 
set-up; persistence of failures in the markets functioning and regulation processes; and 
huge unbalances in different economic and social dimensions. In the case of the STI 
arena it is important to consider: the lack of a social contract for STI; poor endowment 
of scientific and technological capabilities to generate endogenous processes; the 
presence of most of the NSI’s agents, however they do not entirely play their functions; 
and emergence of new agents and lack of a shared vision generate a very slow process 
of governance building. 
 
As discussed in more detail in sections 4 and 5, these features contribute to explain why 
STI are not a national priority. In fact, there is a set of needs (food, health, housing, 
security) that is much more urgent for politicians than the investment in STI when the 
federal budget is being negotiated; short-term decisions has been privileged over long-
term goals; there have been difficulties to change agents´ behavior and create new social 
norms (agents react slowly to new incentives because they are confident that few 
changes will last); and there are unbalances in the evolution of science and technology, 
on one side, and innovation, on the other, that make it difficult to generate co-evolutive 
processes (Dutrénit et al 2007, Avnimelech and Teubal 2006). 
 
Do the policy models take into account these initial conditions? To what extend can 
Mexico copy the policy design of Germany, France or US, or even Korea and China? 
What is clear is that there is an urgent need to think in a more appropriate policy design 
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that starts from the problems of the developing countries world. In this sense, the 
proposal of Perez (2008) is a contribution in this direction. 
 
 
3. A natural resource-based strategy for the development of Latin 
America 
 
Perez (2008), titled “A vision for Latin America: a resource-based strategy for 
technological dynamism and social inclusion”, examines actual trends in globalization 
and in the diffusion of the ICT revolution, and discusses Latin Americas’ potential to 
enter into a new paradigm, which has begun to be installed. She proposes a dual strategy 
for development. This section outlines her ideas. 
 
The document points out that given the globalizations’ recent evolution, Latin America 
faces two important challenges. The first one is competition with China and other Asian 
countries in global markets, and the second is the uneven distribution of income, and 
high poverty levels that rule the region.  
 
Asia is a very densely populated continent with a relatively low endowment of natural 
resources. It has several advantages over Latin America in the fabrication of high 
volume and low cost products, generally produced through cheap labor-intensive 
assembly processes. In contrast, Latin America has abundant natural resources and 
energy, which offers the opportunity to specialize in processes industries based on these 
resources. In the face of the scarcity of raw materials in Asian countries relative to their 
need of growth (e.g. China and India) and the increase in international food prices 
(cereals, processed food, etc), Latin America could become the supplier of raw 
materials, food and other agricultural goods (from the most standard to the most 
sophisticated custom-made products) for the rest of the world. 
 
Concerning the ICT paradigm, it is in the deployment stage; the globalization process 
and the ICT revolution have brought with them the hyper-segmentation of three key 
areas: markets, value chains and technologies. These processes are in the base of the 
proposed strategy.  
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The hyper-segmentation of markets refers to the fact that ‘the ICT revolution has led to 
a refined fragmentation of all markets, not only in manufacturing but also in raw 
materials and services’.  This is expressed in the appearance of upper layers of products 
in most markets, which are produced under conditions that allows associating them to 
the ‘special’, the ‘unique’ or the ‘custom made’. From the standpoint of production, the 
ICT open opportunities to produce at lower scales than those allowed by mass 
production. This creates quasi-monopolistic conditions that would allow the steady 
maintenance of high prices. Perez (2008) argues that new opportunities are opened to 
specialize on “premium” natural resources based products directed to local and global 
niches.  
 
The hyper-segmentation of value chains refers to the fact that ICT have created optimal 
conditions to allow the coordination of activities of different firms integrated into global 
chains. This greater ease of coordination generates, as a counterpart higher motivation 
of global corporations to grant autonomy and incentives to their subsidiaries to 
innovate, foster local advantages, achieve higher positions in the value chains and shift 
the export profile of countries. She asserts that this opens spaces for mutually beneficial 
negotiations with host governments to increase the quality of employment and of 
activities locally developed.  
 
The hyper-segmentation of technologies is associated with an increase of specialization 
in high technologies and its coexistence with traditional methods. In other words, ICT 
allows the coexistence of a greater diversity of technologies. This opens spaces for 
global corporations to focus on their core technologies and outsource with specialized 
suppliers the components they do not wish to produce. She argues that this unlocks 
many opportunities for small local firms, which supply specialized services.  
 
As Perez (2008) argued, today, in the deployment stage of the ICT paradigm, it seems 
that future revolutionary industries will be a combination of biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, bioelectronics, new materials and new energy sources, modeled 
socially by increased interest and concern about the environment. These technologies 
can be broadly related to natural resources based process industries. During the actual 
period of installation of the new paradigm, these technologies would tend to develop in 
connection with some existent leading industries.  
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Facing the challenges and opportunities put forward by the new paradigm, as well as by 
the hyper-segmentation processes associated with the ICT, the document states that a 
window of opportunity for Latin America appears. It is argued that there is a quite clear 
possibility to now start a capability improvement process, aimed at preparing to enter 
the next technological revolution, by using current raw material exports as a platform 
and source of funding. In order to grasp this opportunity it proposes a ‘dual integrated 
model’ for Latin America, based on two strategies. The first one is to promote, from the 
top, competitiveness in world markets. This strategy would be oriented to the activation 
and strengthening of the economies’ growth engines by providing the resources that 
make the model viable. The second is to support, from the bottom, wealth-creation 
activities at local level to generate employment and reduce poverty. This dual strategy 
cannot be implemented only by means of the market; even though it cannot be imposed 
with efficacy by the government, it requires strong governmental leadership.  
 
As every development strategy, it demands a long-term effort. The objectives should 
consider the gradual migration towards products with increasing added value, with 
characteristics each time more specialized and custom-made for the clients, and the 
establishment of strong innovation networks (with participation of firms and local, 
national, continental and international universities). 
 
In order to accomplish all of the objectives, the strategy demands a complementary 
effort amongst different agents to promote some labor-intensive industries, such as 
construction, health and personal services. To achieve this, it is required to strengthen 
the knowledge and the accumulated ‘know-how’ of each country regarding their current 
export products to move technologically upstream, downstream and laterally.  
 
The document recognizes that this dual strategy also requires the development of a 
process of consensus building amongst agents aiming at the convergence of actions; 
moreover, the ‘State or Market’ dichotomy is obsolete and results counterproductive.  
 
The proposal is suggestive, and as such it needs to be discussed broadly in the region. 
There is a set of critical issues that emerge, looking at the design and implementation of 
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such a dual development strategy, which would allow Latin America to take advantage 
of the window of opportunity that emerges from the new paradigm. 
 
• The “dual integrated model” is a dual long-term development strategy. It requires 
the integration of several objectives that historically have been regarded as a trade-
off: those oriented towards increasing competitiveness and those oriented towards 
reducing poverty. Both should be articulated from the set-up. 
• It is required to reorient technological capabilities and the formation of human 
capital. The accumulated technological capabilities should be reoriented towards 
export markets of the processes industries, and towards local, national and global 
niches. This requires an intensive learning process at three complementary levels: 
learning in the public sector to develop capabilities to lead the process, learning in 
the business sector to gradually increase its innovative capabilities; and learning, 
updating and adapting of the education and public research systems. The knowledge 
production and the formation of human capital have to be reoriented to the needs of 
new markets.  
• As Perez (2008) points out, “development opportunities are a moving target, and 
development strategies are temporary”. In this sense, there is an urge to discuss, 
generate agreement and reorient institutional and technological capabilities to seize 
them. This is why it is fundamental to generate consensus amongst agents, which 
implies the creation of effective policies to ensure cooperation of all the involved 
agents (public and private, scientists and entrepreneurs, local and national), as well 
as the coordination of policies and the negotiation of mutually beneficial 
agreements.  
• In the new paradigm, key knowledge areas seem to be biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, bioelectronics, new materials and new energy sources. The 
building of capabilities in these areas requires a shift in the way of thinking and 
acting; behaviors characterized by cooperation, work inside networks, 
multidisciplinary efforts and teamwork appear to be appropriated and should be 
promoted.  
• Even though it is argued that the source for funding could come from the increase in 
raw materials prices, commitments of public and private funds are also required.4  
                                                




4. Efforts to build a new STI strategy: the Mexican case 
 
Recent experience in designing and implementing a new STI policy in Mexico may 
contribute to reflect on some of the challenges that the introduction of a new strategy in 
Latin American countries may confront. 
 
The main efforts of STI policies directed toward the construction of STI capabilities in 
Mexico are connected with the creation in 1970 of CONACYT, as the agency 
responsible of promoting STI activities in the country. As in the case of many other 
similar agencies in the world, the regulatory framework assigns it two roles: 
policymaker and funding agency. In spite of occupying a crucial position in the NSI, in 
practice and since its foundation, its intermediary role between the principal 
(government) and the agent (STI community) has been complicated because of the 
weakness of the social contract regarding STI in Mexico.5 
 
Such weaknesses result, on one hand from CONACYT’s ‘weak political position’ 
inside the government structure, and on the other, from the historically low public 
investment in these activities.  
 
4.1 Recent changes of the STI policy 
 
A number of studies have documented that Mexico, similarly to several Latin American 
countries, has exhibited weaknesses in STI policy design and implementation (FCCT 
2006; Velho 2005; Chudnovsky, Niosi and Bercovich 2000; Vonortas 2002). However, 
the Mexican STI policy has evolved over time. The design of STI policy during the 
period 2000-2006 benefited from several changes on the regulatory framework and 
cumulative learning processes from previous experiences, as well as from the adaptation 
of applied instruments in other countries, particularly from the OECD and Brazil.  
 
                                                
5 See Braun (1993), van der Meulen (2003) and Morris (2003) about the role of intermediary agents, 
according to the principal-agent theory applied to STI policy. 
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Amongst the most significant legal reforms we could highlight the Law for the Foment 
of Scientific Research and Technological Development in 1999, the publication during 
the year 2002 of the Special Program of Science and technology 2001-2006 (PECYT 
2001-2006) – as the main document that guidelines STI policy in Mexico – and later the 
Science and Technology Law and the new CONACYTs’ Organic Law in 2002. These 
laws include a set of vertical and horizontal mechanisms for the coordination of policies 
and decisions, such as the budget inter-secretarial committee integrated by vice-
ministries with scientific and technological activities, and the National Conference on 
Science and Technology integrated by STI organisms from state and municipal 
governments. In addition, during 2002 the Advisory Forum for Science and Technology 
(FCCT) was created, associated with CONACYTs’ Organic Law, an organism 
integrated by representatives from communities of agents (associations of private 
industrial and agriculture sectors, and of academics, the most important universities, 
etc.) to propose policies, programs and budget orientation to CONACYT and hence 
contribute to the generation of the required consensus for the installation of a modern 
institutional framework. 
 
The Science and Technology Law of 2002 created the base for a ‘State Policy’ on the 
matter; STI received a greater priority under the assumption of an increasing investment 
and commitment from governmental organisms, as well as the adoption of an integrated 
budget for STI at federal level. In this manner, reforms from 2002 granted CONACYT 
greater autonomy and independence from the Ministry of Public Education, where it 
was previously located, as well as greater coordination powers as head of the NSI. The 
new CONACYT’s Organic Law in particular, located it under the direct command of 
the President of Mexico, as the head of the National Council of Scientific Research and 
Technological Development 
 
The principles that shape the new STI model include: (i) the adoption of tighter quality 
standards and the pursuit of pertinence amongst research and development (R&D) 
activities in the public research system, which is perceived as a greater orientation 
towards the solution of national economic and social issues, (ii) the explicit intention to 
promote the interactivity and coordination amongst NSI’s agents, (iii) compromise 
towards the regionalization of country wide STI capabilities, (iv) the promotion of 
innovation activities, particularly in the private sector, and finally (v) the creation of 
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spaces for the participation of large groups of the Mexican society. (PECYT, 2001-
2006)  
 
Such objectives translated into the introduction of 60 funds and programs operated by 
CONACYT, individually or in connection with other organisms and entities. The policy 
mix includes:   
• 17 Sectoral Funds: Operated jointly by CONACYT and ministries or other 
governmental institutions, which promote the development and the consolidation 
of STI capabilities according with the strategic needs of each of the participating 
sectors (e.g. basic research, innovation, energy, agriculture, etc.); they operate as 
competitive funds. 
• 30 Regional Funds: Operated jointly by CONACYT and state and municipal 
governments, which aim to develop local STI capabilities and fund projects 
oriented to local needs and conditions, they operate also as competed funds. 
• Institutional Funds: This category includes a wide range of instruments – from 
the development of human resources to strategic projects-, under CONACYTs’ 
direct control. The most important has been the AVANCE program, which seeks 
to promote innovation amongst private firms (last mile). 
• The National System of Researchers: It is one of the STI instruments with more 
tradition in the country, it was created in 1984 and its main objectives include 
the promotion of formation, development and consolidation of a critical mass of 
high-level researchers, mainly inside the public system. It grants pecuniary 
incentives (monthly compensation) and non-pecuniary (status and recognition) 
to researchers based on their productivity and quality of their research.  
• Post-graduate Scholarships Program: This program was created in 1971 and it 
grants scholarships to post-graduate students in Mexico and abroad. 
• R&D Fiscal Incentives: This has been the most successful instrument to promote 
R&D activities amongst the private sector between 2001and 2008. The Ministry 
o Finances has decided the granted amount, which has grown throughout the 
period to reach 450 million dollars.  
• Direct Support to Innovation. During 2009 R&D Fiscal Incentives were 
substituted by direct support to R&D activities. 
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The Special Program for Science, Technology and Innovation (PECiTI 2007-2012), 
introduced by the new administration, provides continuity to the efforts to redirect STI 
activities. The document, with vision to the year 2030, defines the steps to follow in 
order to achieve gradual development and consolidation of the NSI in four stages: (i) 
2007-2012, strengthen STI capabilities, (ii) 2013-2018, accelerated development, (iii) 
2019-2024, competitive consolidation, and (iv) 2024-2030, NSI maturity. This program 
provides continuity to the strategy from the previous administration, reinforcing weak 
points. However, there are no significant changes in the funding commitments, which 
sustain the previous historical trends towards low investment levels in STI.  
 
According to the goals established on the PECYT 2001-2006, gross expenditures in 
research and experimental development (GERD) in relation to GDP should reach 1.0%. 
However, recent data obtained from CONACYT (2007) shows the persistence of a 
significant gap in relation to this target. Both the Federal Expenditures on Science and 
Technology (FES&T) and the GERD as a percentage of the GDP have leveled at below 
0.5%. Figures for 2007 were 3,500 and 4,000 million dollars respectively. The 
ministries of Public Education and Energy appear to have a greater control over the 
NSI, since their individual participations inside FES&T are 33% and 18%, respectively, 
while CONACYT’s amount represents 17% (Dutrénit et al. 2008). This has weakened 
CONACYT’s role as coordinator of the NSI.  
 
Aside from budget deficiencies, there are certain remarkable achievements, such as the 
emergence of new actors and the NSI reconfiguration, the existence of STI capabilities 
built throughout the country, universities in every state and public research centers in 
several areas of technology and different states, an increase in the amount of R&D 
financed by the business sector (from 14.3% in 1993 to 41% in 2005), and successful 
performances in some specific areas. Actually, recent evidence shows greater 
technology incorporation by the business sector, with a group of firms achieving some 
commercial and innovative successes (FCCT 2006; Dutrénit et al. 2008). The 
emergence of knowledge-based regional productive clusters is also apparent. The 
system has proved to have the capacity to absorb the new public funding, and the STI 
policy has shown capabilities to introduce changes in agent behavior, in this sense, 
sectoral and regional funds have stimulated the reorientation of research groups towards 
the solution of sectoral and regional problems. R&D fiscal incentives have helped 
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increase firms’ R&D, and the use of competitive funds has stimulated the generation of 
country wide capabilities to define demands, evaluate and manage projects.  
 
In spite of the achievements, assessment of the Mexican NSI suggests that this system is 
still rather small and is mainly derived from the ‘aggregation’ of a number of 
institutions and public and private organizations operating in a poorly articulated 
fashion. In spite of improvements in some performance indicators, the bulk of Mexican 
firms observe their competitiveness to be threatened, given their poor performance in 
knowledge production and transfer. Similarly, firms face strong difficulties for 
absorbing knowledge generated by universities, public research centers, and from 
abroad. The dearth of linkages between knowledge producers and users hinders the 
articulation required to produce positive and cumulative effects. In addition, current 
programs in support of innovation remain weak, poorly integrated, and only in 2009 
will provide direct subsidies for R&D. Likewise, there is a bias of the public funds 
towards large firms for which investment in these activities appears more attractive. 
Resources available to promote innovative capabilities among small and medium-size 




In spite of accumulated improvements since 1999, STI policy faces several important 
challenges: (i) slowness regarding the institutional reform related to the public research 
system, (ii) limited public investment in STI activities, (iii) insufficient empowerment 
of CONACYT as the agent responsible for the NSI governance, (iv) inertias associated 
to the operation of policy instruments from previous administrations, which hold a large 
share of the STI budget, (v) a policy mix designs which have not contributed to a 
coherent incentives structure, thus contradictory incentives allow for opportunist 
behaviors, and (iv) slow learning processes inside CONACYT due largely to an 
orientation towards implementation.  
 
Additionally, there have been observed difficulties to build consensus, when STI 
resources are extremely small and the budget does not grow. There have been of 
particular importance the tensions generated between funding to science versus funding 
to innovation, between curiosity-driven science and problem-oriented science, and 
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between funds managed by federal and regional governments.  
 
According to Van der Meulen (2003: 325), we could characterize CONACYT amongst 
the agencies which “strongly identify with the scientific community, and monitoring is 
organized through the evaluation of peers denominated by the scientific community, 
which also request funding. In such configuration, even when the governments transfer 
resources, in practice scientists keep control of actions”. This has demanded great 
lobbying work and generation of consensus in the scientific community to change the 
composition of the budget, which has not been enough.  
 
Recent reforms and the – albeit limited – transformations recorded in the NSI suggest 
that the current environment may be potentially more conducive to the development of 
STI activities. There is also a growing awareness and willingness of specific sectors of 
Mexican society to tap into STI activities in order to achieve some of their long-term 
socioeconomic development goals. There is strong evidence which suggest that agents 
are sensitive to the necessity of generating consensus. The Mixed Funds are the result of 
a concern to favor the regionalization of STI capabilities, and have allowed for learning 
amongst regions. Further than the observed deficiencies in its design and 
implementation, since 2000 the STI policy has shifted the incentives, which seek to 
build new social norms able to lay foundations for strategic behaviors amongst agents.  
 
 
5. Lessons from the Mexican case6 
 
The experience of introducing new STI policy design in Mexico throughout this decade 
allows the extraction of a set of lessons in relation to the construction of a coherent 
incentives structure that stimulates shifts amongst agents’ behavior, the definition of the 
leadership for the strategy, the conditions to ensure governance of the NSI and the 
building of consensus. Such elements should enter into the discussion of any new 
strategy for Latin American countries. 
 
                                                
6 This section draws on FCCT (2006) and Dutrénit et al. (2008). 
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5.1 Incentives structure and agents’ strategic behavior 
 
The Mexican case shows that putting in practice a new STI policy strategy  requires that 
agents – individuals as well as organizations – that integrate the academic, 
entrepreneurial, and governmental sectors, adopt new patterns of behavior. In order to 
accomplish the emergence and reinforcement of such patterns it is necessary to modify 
the incentives structure and introduce some changes into formal institutions.  Both types 
of changes should be based on the existing legal framework, which should be reformed 
and operated in a consistent manner. However, a slow pace for change in the legal 
framework and institutions delays the emergence of new social norms in relation to STI 
and the new strategic behaviors required. 
 
Features of strategic behavior from agents  
The characteristics of the deployment stage of the ICT paradigm, and in the face of 
possibilities to seize windows of opportunity that could open during the installation 
stage of a new paradigm, demand changes of the agents’ behavior. The Mexican case 
suggests that some strategic behaviors that appear to be relevant are the following: 
 
• The business sector: Assume business risks implied in R&D investment, post R&D 
and innovation to accent the observed transformation in some segments that tend to 
link with universities and public research centers in order to generate knowledge, 
improve the way in which public funding is taken advantage of, and implement new 
strategies to develop managerial capabilities and business know-how in the case of 
the small and medium-size firms (e.g. elaboration of business plans, capabilities of 
negotiation, etc.) 
• The academic sector: Reinforce the commitment to attend human resources and 
knowledge generation demands from the business sector and society, improve 
research’s social commitment, and keep and deepen excellence evaluation 
processes.  
• Public administrations at every level (federal, state, municipal): Increase the 
strategic capacity to design policy; change significantly the coordination with other 
agents and the global coherence of the policy mix; provide close follow-through to 
the implementation of policy and prevent changes that could affect the context, the 
rules and the policies in every required moment; design institutions and incentives   
 19 
in order to make more flexibly public intervention according to swaps in the 
demands and requirements from the different agents; and at state level to design and 
implement more and better instruments to foster STI according to each region. 
Additionally, the proposal of a dual strategy requires the mixture of top-down and 
bottom-up policies emanated from regions and localities, which should be 
compatible and interactive. 
• Jointly, the academic sector and public administrations: Develop science education 
programs at the primary level, and science divulgation and other activities to 
increase the sensitivity of society in relation to achievements obtained by scientific 
and technological knowledge. 
• Every agent in the NSI: Build strategic intelligence capabilities, comprehend its 
position on the system, and develop cooperative strategic behavior with other agents 
and seek for collective learning from experience. The success of fostering STI will 
largely depend on the development of collaboration modes amongst agents, and 
overcoming distrust inherited from past experience, which is particularly relevant 
amongst universities and public research centers. 
 
The initial conditions to breed and induce these behaviors are diverse in agent type and 
country. In the Mexican case, there are observed behaviors that point out, in some cases, 
incipient movements and in others, more decisive action towards strategic behaviors. 
These shifts have been encouraged and should be reinforced by formal institutions and 
the incentives structure. These gradual shifts also require an understanding of the 
strategy by the agents in order to continually adjust their behavior.  
 
Incentives structure and social norms 
In order for strategic behavior features to emerge or reinforce, it is necessary to modify 
the incentives structure.  This refers to a set of mechanisms – penalties and rewards – 
that shape social norms, and determine a set of accepted social norms, in this case 
associated to STI, over which agents’ behavior is built. Some of these norms refer to 
ways of funding, contracting, promoting and rewarding researchers and firms. 
 
Social conducts are very complex, norms and behaviors that have been taught or have 
developed through time, play an important role in the construction of a society (Laffont 
and Martimort 2002). In face of the design and implementation of a new strategy, it is to 
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be expected that agents tend to replicate behaviors that they have learned as a result of a 
particular conception of the role of STI in society. This makes difficult the 
transformation of behaviors towards strategic ones, when STI policies are introduced 
with new objectives and instruments. However, as agents respond to incentives, their 
modifications may induce shifts amongst agents’ behavior. There are several types of 
incentives that influence the behavior of the STI community (Puchet 2008): 
 
(i) Economic incentives associated with the policy mix and the budgetary 
assignation of resources. 
(ii) Incentives that change the rules of the game relative to specific STI 
activities. 
(iii) Incentives that modify general aspects of the regulatory framework. 
 
Economic incentives related to the policy mix and budgetary assignations of resources 
emerge from government intervention based on financial resources, which tend to 
induce certain social behaviors amongst agents.  There is a set of these incentives that 
change the behavior of agents and hence generate permanent guidelines or behavior 
(e.g. productivity based rewards to researchers), in other words, they change premises 
from agents’ decision-making processes, and therefore become unquestionable. There 
are other incentives that only change opportunity costs from decisions related to the 
realization of an activity, but the conduct disappears if the incentive related to the 
activity is gone (e.g. scholarships). It is necessary to modify the incentives structure, 
particularly those incentives that contribute to building new premises for action.  
 
It is necessary to stimulate strategic behaviors for the design and implementation of a 
new strategy. The Mexican experience suggests that in the case of rewards for 
researchers based on productivity (so popular today in Mexico and other Latin 
American countries), it would be convenient to migrate towards the constitution of 
specific stimulus systems that distinguish several types of activity – scientific research, 
technological development, high level human resource formation-, with more precise 
orientation and less generic evaluations. These stimuli should be incorporated in the 
lines of action defined for the new strategy.  
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In the case of incentives for universities and public research centers, private firms and 
state-owned firms, the foment funds could be reoriented towards programs in several 
stages and aspects of technological development, such as the adaptation, diffusion and 
transfer of technologies. These funds should privilege the assignation of resources 
towards collaborative projects amongst agents from the academic and productive 
sectors, and amongst agents of different regions. In the case of incentives for firms that 
perform R&D and innovation, it could be appropriate to emphasize the support to small 
and medium-size firms and processing industries.  
 
The incentives that shift the rules relative to specific STI activities, and those which 
modify general aspects of the regulatory framework, are normative; they materialize in 
the introduction of specific norms, which tend to change the rules to which NSI agents 
are subject. The vast majority of such norms emanates from legal ordinances different 
form the STI ones, and do not articulate coherently with those incentives associated 
with the policy mix. They include aspects related to intellectual property, governance, 
evaluation of universities and public research centers, the creation of technology based 
firms with the participation of researchers, as well as other normative incentives that 
emerge from a more general environment and influence not only STI agents, but also 
those which participate in a wider range of economic activities. Included in these sets  
are: capital markets regulation relative to portfolio investment and the introduction of 
risk capital instruments into the stock exchange; labor markets regulatory framework 
relative to employment stability and qualification of labor; norms that rule the aperture 
of firms; fiscal operation and the deduction of investment expenditures; regulations 
related to the use of ICT; and the criteria for public purchases. (Puchet 2008) 
 
The economic and normative incentives configure the incentives structure and 
regulatory framework for STI, which in turn condition agents’ behavior and contribute 
to the generation of strategic behaviors. The analysis of the integration and the 
consequences of these normative frameworks over the mentioned behaviors appear to 
be a crucial task for the implementation of a successful strategy.  
 
5.2 Leadership, governance and the generation of consensus 
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The Mexican case shows a set of difficulties that emerge for the coordination between 
local/regional and federal levels, different ministries, academy and private sector, and 
even within CONACYT between different directions. It was quite difficult to build the 
required consensus to support the process of change. Efforts to introduce modifications 
in the incentives structure to generate certain agents’ strategic behaviors should have 
been accompanied by changes in formal institutions and forms of governance.  
 
It seemed particularly important to define more clearly the required features of the 
regulatory framework, introduce a coherent set of legal reforms and generate consensus 
about the composition of the organisms in charge of the orientation, approval and 
implementation of the strategy.  
 
The distinction between legal regulations and formal institutions is pertinent here. The 
regulatory framework around the NIS is seen as a structured set of rules and norms. 
Some components of this set emerge from pieces of laws, presidential decrees, 
regulations and other legal principles of secondary importance. These shape formal 
institutions as a subset of rules that is used and practiced by agents and organizations. In 
practice, such a subsystem is formed in an independent manner in relation to those 
written regulations of different kinds – legal, by decree, regulations, etc. To the formal 
institutions thus conceived one should incorporate routines, habits, codes of conduct for 
both agents and organizations that shape the subsystem of informal institutions, referred 
to above as social norms. 
 
In the Mexican case, the legal reforms from 1999 were a step forward but are still 
insufficient to provide the formal institutions that could facilitate the new strategy. Even 
today, the regulatory framework remains insufficient and fragmented and interferes with 
the NSI’s consolidation and development. 
 
A lesson learned from this experience is that it would be useful to distinguish between 
different roles of leadership. On one side, the representatives of the NSI’s main agents 
should be included as part of the decision-takers, and on the other, the policy-makers 
should have the specialized function of designing and implementing the strategy. This 
distinction has a double purpose: (i) to improve the forms of harmonization between 
representatives of the main agents and government officials, and (ii) to separate two 
 23 
different arenas, the political-strategic agreements and the design and operation of the 
policies.  
 
Three relevant lessons learned from the Mexican case are the following: 
 
• On the regulatory framework. An appropriate regulatory framework is 
required to facilitate the coordination between the regulations set specifically to 
govern STI activities and the regulations to other activities that somehow 
overlap (or even comprise) those related to STI, to improve the government 
organisms, and to facilitate the coordination mechanisms between agents to 
allow them to agree around the strategy's objectives and lines of action, and to 
interact.  
 
• On the leader team. The process of change should be led by a team integrated 
by the main decision-takers in STI from the government (ministries with the 
highest investment in STI), the main universities, the states or cities with larger 
expenditures in STI, and large private and public-owned firms with large R&D 
centers. They can have the political and financial capacity to encourage a 
process of change. This composition of the leader team would empower the 
strategic decisions with the required autonomy from short-term policies or 
measures decided by the Executive. At the same time, the involvement of the 
main agents in the decision about the strategic objectives of the strategy would 
generate better conditions to induce changes in the agents’ behavior towards 
strategic ones. The leader team would take the long-term decisions.  
 
• On the STI agency role. The STI agency can play the role of policymakers of 
the strategy; experts in design and implementation of STI policies should be 
called for this role. This team would take the short-term decisions and would be 
responsible for the implementation and operation side of the strategy. The STI 
agency, as CONACYT in the Mexican case, should take the strategic 
coordination of the NSI, which overcome the usual role of a funding agency.  
 
As the installation period of the new paradigm could be short, conditions for rapid 
learning from the agents are essential. In this sense, the decision-takers should be 
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convinced about the opportunity for such strategy and, as highlighted by Perez (2008), 
understand ‘that development opportunities are a moving target and that development 
strategies are temporary and must be updated and reshaped accordingly’. In parallel, 
policymakers should develop and continuously improve certain skills, such as: 
interpreting trends; designing an appropriate policy mix, with the flexibility to redesign 
it as the strategy evolves; understanding the variety of firms, sectors and technologies, 
and their productive and technological chains, and therefore be able to intervene in the 
weak points in each moment; and inducing changes within the incentives structure to 
stimulate new social norms and then to foster the strategic behaviors required in each 
stage. All these entail a good system of indicators, monitoring and evaluation.  
 
Firms and academy should also develop a learning capacity to adapt to the moving 
targets. Firms should react promptly to the new policy instruments and academy should 
develop the capability of response to new demands generated by the new instruments.  
 
This type of strategy requires the generation of consensus between agents, both for the 
design and start-up as for its sustainability over time. But, such a consensus demands 
that each agent has a clear idea of what it could win and lose, and of his commitments. 
The strategy should promote the participation of all the stakeholders through forums, 
seminars and other activities to take into account their opinions on the results in each 
strategy stage. The idea of generating a participative society could be called for again. 
The generation of consensus should be the main feature in the decision taking process, 
which requires an evolution toward efficient and horizontal forms of NSI governance. 
In this respect, different levels of coordination are essential: academic sector, business 
sector and government; national/federal and regional/local policies; private and public 
sector; objectives of both branches of the strategy; and STI policies amongst others 
policy arenas.  
 
Even though the generation of consensus and the emergence of new forms of 
governance are a difficult task and can be seen as a key challenge, what is clear is that 
only long-term policies based on consensus and the agents commitments can reach 
cumulative effects and generate the necessary changes in agents’ behaviors.  
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Another challenge refers to the dual feature of the proposed strategy and the need of 
combining the objectives of the top-down strategy with those related to the bottom-up 
one. In this sense, the challenge is to be able to articulate an integrative vision of all the 
national potentialities and demands. 
 
5.3 Resources and viability of the strategy  
 
The recent Mexican experience also illustrates that a successful change of incentives to 
induce modification in the agents’ behavior should go hand in hand with a substantial 
increase in the STI budget. Changes in the composition of an invariable budget affect 
agents’ interests, and generate tensions that militate against the process of change. Thus, 
to avoid confrontation in the initial period, it would be better to keep the traditional 
resources allocation and reorient the additional resources to the new targets of the 
strategy. 
 
In this context, a successful strategy requires a commitment from the government to 
increase the budget for STI. Certainly, the private sector should assign concurrent funds, 
however it is hard to believe that most of the additional resources could come from the 
private sector, at least during the initial stage.  
 
If additional public funds are imperative in the initial stage, the Ministry of Finances is 
called on to be involved in this process from the very beginning. It should be involved 
not only to ensure the increase of public resources and the reorientation of these 
resources as the strategy evolves along different stages, but also to support the required 
institutional reforms of the NSI. In other words, the Ministry of Finance should be 
involved in the governance of the NSI. In the Mexican experience, the lobbying with 
the Ministry of Finance was not successful in convincing it about the future increase of 
public income associated with an investment in the designed strategy. 
 
 
6. Final reflections 
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Mexican as many other Latin American governments have not believed that STI can 
stimulate economic growth and solve its problems of unemployment and poverty. There 
is no clear social contract for STI, and the investment in STI has been extremely 
reduced over time. In the last decade, agents have observed gradual changes towards the 
strategic behaviors described above. This suggests the emergence of the minimum 
conditions to rethink the role that STI and knowledge can play in satisfying social needs 
and creating welfare. However, it seems that the government lacks clarity about the 
appropriate strategies and the required consensus.  
 
Concerning to the strategies, Mexico has designed and implemented innovation policy 
models promoted by international organizations. They were clearly built having into 
mind the initial conditions of central economies, with a critical mass of science and 
technology capabilities, several economic and social problems already solved, and still 
weaknesses on innovation capabilities, which explains the emphasis on innovation alone 
and not also on science and technology. 
 
The dual development strategy based on both STI for building robust resource based-
processing industries and attending the employment generation in the localities 
proposed by Perez (2008) is very suggestive. First, because it looks at Latin America’s 
endowments, and second because it positions these endowments as potentialities to the 
new technological paradigm.  
 
However, the design and implementation of this strategy requires breaking inertias and 
acquiring a long-term vision, generating consensus between the main agents, and taking 
risks by the local and national governments. This strategy should be supported in the 
formulation of a long-term public policy, where coordination and governance 
mechanisms acquire relevance to allow the participation of society. This policy should 
be designed and implemented with the participation of all the agents – academy, 
business sector and governments at national/federal and local levels. Its implementation 




This new strategy requires additional public resources. The increase of the budget 
would be the way to reorient fresh resources to new targets while avoiding tensions that 
could emerge when the same budget is allocated in a different way.  
 
A flexible incentives structure has to be built and to evolve according to the moving 
targets to avoid opportunist behaviors that can come out when contradictory incentives 
coexist. A slow rhythm of change of the general framework conditions delays the 
emergence of new social norms in relation to STI and of the strategic behaviors required 
for the success of the strategy. 
 
Leadership, consensus and commitments seem to be key features to initiate and sustain 
a process of change led by a dual strategy of development for Latin America. If the 
main agents are involved in the decision-taking process, it is more likely that they are 
going to fulfill the required commitments. Long-term policies based on leadership, 
consensus and commitments of the main agents can breed cumulative effects and 
generate changes in agents’ behaviors, which feedbacks this process and produces 
endogenous dynamics. 
 
Thus, the emergence and evolution of such a strategy depend on the initial 
commitments, the joint efforts of the main agents and the building of a cooperative 
dynamic between them. Four aspects seem to be extremely important for the success of 
this process:  
 
1. An explicit agreement between all the agents about the objectives and lines of 
actions of the dual strategy.  
2. An agreement between the main agents and the government about the 
composition and role that the leader team of the strategy can play. 
3. A commitment of the Executive, jointly with the Ministry of Finance, to assign 
additional resources to the STI budget and to allow the reorientation of these 
resources according to the stages of the strategy.  




Gradually over time, the progress of the strategy will generate a reduction of the need 
for additional public resources, as innovation is endogenized and catalytic attribute of 
the STI policy emerge (Teubal 1997; Avnimelech and Teubal 2008). In addition, an 
increase in tax collection is expected, associated with the increase of the economic 
activity. All this will reduce the pressure on the public resources, changing the 
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